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CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE LEGAL  
NORMS AND NORMS UNDERLYING 
POPULAR BELIEFS: WITCHCRAFT IN  
AFRICA AS A CASE STUDY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Beliefs about the causation of life and death, fortune and 
misfortune, and good and evil change over time.  Often, these beliefs 
are based on different concepts of human agency—concepts that have 
important implications for views on responsibility, culpability, and 
liability.  As normative orientations change, societies undergo periods 
of profound transformation, and social and interpersonal tensions 
often develop in the process. 
One example of this phenomenon is the friction that results when 
norms underlying popular beliefs are at odds with emerging state 
legal norms.  People might feel that new standards of behavior 
established by the courts are difficult to comprehend.  They may 
sense that these rules apply retroactively without prior notification—
in essence, they may perceive the standards as “foreign.”  During this 
transition period, judges face hard choices in establishing what is 
“fair” under such emerging legal norms. 
Examining judicial decisions where norms underlying popular 
beliefs clash with emerging state legal norms provides a window on 
how courts negotiate periods of major belief change.  It is instructive 
to evaluate how judges in developing countries address these 
problematic issues, and to specifically identify the types of legal 
reasoning judges employ in attempting to integrate different value 
systems into a coherent rule of law. 
This article treats African disputes about witchcraft as a case 
study of the conflict between state legal norms and norms underlying 
popular beliefs.  The aim is to examine how these disputes challenge 
judges to produce fair outcomes when legal cultures clash and to 
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profile and explore responses judges have offered.  This article 
questions how judges should address cases in which norms underlying 
popular beliefs conflict with state legal norms by specifically focusing 
on judicial reasoning in criminal cases involving witchcraft.1  Parts II–
IV examine how judges have addressed spectral evidence, witchcraft 
as the basis for a defense of provocation, and imputations of 
witchcraft.  Part V summarizes the findings of the previous three 
Parts, and suggests, based on these findings, effective ways for judges 
to handle cases involving witchcraft. 
The author combed the law reports of several common law 
African countries for cases involving witchcraft.  The author’s original 
intent was to trace trends in the way judges decide these cases.  Thus, 
the author initially sought to explore changes in the form of legal 
reasoning over time within several legal systems (specifically 
Botswana, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).  Unfortunately, because law 
reporting has broken down in some of these countries and some new 
law reports are currently incomplete, it is difficult to clearly define 
these trends.  Nonetheless, the available cases suffice for sketching 
the types of judicial reasoning employed in cases involving witchcraft. 
Across large parts of the African continent, beliefs in witchcraft 
have “run amuck.”2  According to Robert B. Seidman, “[i]n Africa, as 
in Europe, witchcraft superstition seemingly flourishes in times of 
social instability.”3  The appearance of cases involving witchcraft 
appear to have increased, and they illustrate one challenge many 
African countries face. 
Modern African states generally do not see witchcraft as 
legitimate, although they usually stop short of criminalizing popular 
beliefs in witchcraft.  In contrast, legislative acts criminalizing the 
practice of witchcraft originate in the colonial era, and independent 
governments have not removed these statutes—and many continue to 
enforce them.  For example, both South Africa and Zimbabwe’s 
Witchcraft Suppression Acts make it a crime to accuse someone of 
 
 1. This article discusses one civil case, K. Hassani v. Kithuku & Chali, 1985 TLR 212 (HC) 
in Part II.B.3, infra, as an example of how judges address spectral evidence in cases involving 
witchcraft.  This case is included because the author located few published cases involving 
spectral evidence.  As the court noted, the Hassani case could have been tried as a criminal case 
under Tanzania's Witchcraft Ordinance of 1928 (Ch. 18 of the Laws of Tanzania), because it 
involved the practice of witchcraft.  Id. at 216. 
 2. Peter Geschière & Cyprian F. Fisiy, Domesticating Personal Violence: Witchcraft, 
Courts and Confessions in Cameroon, 64 AFRICA 323, 324 (1994). 
 3. PARRINDER, WITCHCRAFT: EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN 205 (1958). 
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being a witch.4  According to Tanzania’s Witchcraft Ordinance, 
anyone who is caught practicing witchcraft, or who possesses 
witchcraft materials, can be charged with an offense.5  Under Section 
251 of the Cameroon Penal Code: 
Whoever commits any act of witchcraft, magic or divination liable 
to disturb public order or tranquility, or to harm another in his 
person, property or substance, whether by taking a reward or 
otherwise, shall be punished with imprisonment for from two to ten 
years, and with a fine of five thousand to one hundred thousand 
francs.6 
A. Significance 
This note is significant because it provides insight into the effects 
of a clash between norms underlying popular beliefs and state legal 
norms.  Alan Watson, a scholar on legal transplants, presents three 
tests to evaluate the utility of a source of law or method of 
lawmaking: (1) responsiveness of the law to serious needs and desires 
of a community; (2) comprehensibility of the law by the people who 
are affected by it; and (3) comprehensiveness of the law in providing 
certain answers to legal problems.7  Watson argues: 
The more easily a source of law allows law to change when society 
undergoes change, the better the source of law. . . . The more 
comprehensible the law, the more satisfactory the source of law. . . . 
The more certainly the existing law can provide an answer to the 
legal problems that arise, the more satisfactory is the source of law.8 
Thus, a lack of responsiveness, comprehensibility, and comprehen-
siveness makes the law less familiar to, and less accessible by, the 
community it serves,  essentially rendering the law ineffective.  
Further, “[a] law that fails to take into account the social ethos of the 
 
 4. §1(a) Witchcraft Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (amended in 1997) (South Africa); §3 
Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (amended in 2001) (Zimbabwe); §4 Witchcraft 
Ordinance of 1928 (Ch. 18 of the Laws of Tanzania) (amended in 1956). 
 5. §3 Witchcraft Ordinance of 1928 (Ch. 18 of the Laws of Tanzania) (amended in 1956). 
 6. CYPRIAN F. FISIY, PALM TREE JUSTICE IN THE BERTOUA COURT OF APPEAL: THE 
WITCHCRAFT CASES 6 (1990). See André Belombé Yombi, La répression de la Sorcellerie dans 
le Code Pénal Camerounais: Le cas du Kong dans le Ntem, 5 JAHRBUCH FÜR AFRIKANISCHES 
RECHT 3, 3–12 (1986), for a detailed discussion of witchcraft in the Cameroon Penal Code. 
 7. ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY 112 (1984). 
Watson discusses these tests in the context of his proposed two-tier method of lawmaking.  
Based on Watson's three tests, a "satisfactory" method of lawmaking is one that creates laws 
that are familiar to, and accessible by, a community that the law serves.  This implies that a 
satisfactory method of lawmaking is one that reconciles a conflict between state legal norms and 
norms underlying popular beliefs. 
 8. Id. 
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community it is supposed to guide risks being ignored and hence, 
remaining a dead letter, incapable of inducing change.”9 
The effect of a conflict between state legal norms and norms 
underlying popular beliefs in witchcraft, as seen in several African 
countries, is exemplary of Watson’s argument.  According to Kenyan 
legal scholar Onesmus K. Mutungi, killing a witch “is not only 
approved but . . . is also a praiseworthy service in the eyes of” many 
communities.10  Thus, the judicial practice of punishing individuals 
who kill alleged witches creates a conflict between state legal norms 
and norms underlying popular beliefs.  This conflict reduces the law’s 
effectiveness, as many people believe “that the law is in collusion with 
the witches.”11  If the law is more responsive to popular needs to 
regulate witchcraft, and if it provides a comprehensive way of 
addressing these needs in a manner accessible to the general 
population, perhaps the conflict between popular and state legal 
norms would be reconciled. 
These kinds of challenges extend beyond the boundaries of 
witchcraft.  For example, norms underlying popular beliefs and state 
legal norms clash when immigrants to the United States perform child 
marriages, which are prohibited by U.S. law.12  Although it may be 
acceptable, even encouraged, in a culture for girls under the age of 
eighteen to marry adult men, according to Western cultural and legal 
norms, this is prohibited.  Immigrants who practice child marriages 
potentially face imprisonment, and their children could be taken into 
protective custody.13  Thus, the attempt at the reconciliation of 
popular and legal norms profiled in this article is useful in other 
contexts. 
B. Witchcraft 
Beliefs in witchcraft take many different forms.  In Kenya, for 
example, one society’s definitions of witches and witchcraft often 
differ from those employed in other societies.14  One common notion 
underlying witchcraft is the belief that supernatural forces may be 
 
 9. ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT IN EAST AFRICA WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA 104 (1977). 
 10. Id. at 59. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Don Terry, Child Brides in Middle America: Mideast Culture Clashes with the Law, 
INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, December 3, 1996, at 11. 
 13. Id. 
 14. MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at xviii. 
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used as a means to achieve a personal goal (e.g., harm, profit, 
fertility).  In other words, “[w]itchcraft beliefs embrace[] a wide range 
of ideas, practices, and motivations, but in their various forms they 
usually share[] the idea that the power to inflict injury and benefit 
could be exercised through unobservable, supernatural means.”15  
Beliefs in witchcraft are often used to explain fortunes and 
misfortunes, good and evil, and life and death.  According to 
Mutungi: 
In the so-called civilized communities, inexplicable eventualities 
and misfortunes are attributed to fate, bad luck, or the will of God.  
The native African seeks his explanation in witchcraft.  What must 
be noted, though, is that in both communities, the struggle is the 
same—a search for causal explanation for misfortunes.16 
In many African societies, “every evil and misfortune that is 
incapable of rational explanation is attributed to witchcraft.”17  
According to the group Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 
belief in witchcraft “[t]akes its origin . . . in the psychological need to 
provide an outlet for repressed hostility, frustration and anxiety.  It 
provides a way to explain serious misfortunes and render those who 
suffer them blameless in the eyes of society.”18 
By attributing “inexplicable eventualities” and misfortunes to 
supernatural forces, the belief in witchcraft does not appear strikingly 
different from many of the world’s major religions.  However, unlike 
major religions, witchcraft is difficult to define “because it is not a 
coherent body of beliefs.”19  Witchcraft attributes supernatural 
powers to a human being, either through ascribing these attributes to 
a pact with the devil, similar to accusations made in New England 
during the Salem Witch Trials, or through other means.  When 
deciding cases involving witchcraft during the 1930s, Sudanese courts 
arrived at 
a very strange dichotomy.  Killing a human being, believing him to 
be a ghost or supernatural creature, is not an offense, and yields an 
acquittal.  Killing a human being with supernatural powers [i.e., a 
witch] even if he is believed to have used them to bewitch the 
 
 15. JENNIFER WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 380 (2000). 
 16. MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at 105. 
 17. Id. at xvii. 
 18. Gender and Witchcraft Killings in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: TOMRIC Agency, March 
27,  2000, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200003270107.html (on file with Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law). 
 19. MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at xviii. 
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defendant, constitutes murder, and merits the death penalty or life 
imprisonment.20 
This demonstrates the potential complexity of cases involving 
witchcraft.  Witchcraft challenges ideas of human agency.  For 
example, an alleged witch may be viewed either as a supernatural 
being or a human being with supernatural powers.  If judges choose 
to determine how a defendant perceives a witch, a conviction of 
murder could be reduced if the defendant intended to kill a 
supernatural being and not a human being with supernatural powers.  
Based on the cases discussed in this article, most African beliefs in 
witchcraft involve the perception that a witch is a human being with 
supernatural powers. 
Disputes involving witchcraft arrive at courts in several ways.  In 
only a few places today are there still trials of people accused of 
practicing witchcraft, although legislation such as the Witchcraft 
Suppression Acts long ago made it possible to punish people who 
openly practice witchcraft or accuse others of doing so. 
Recently, judges in southeastern Cameroon have meted out 
harsh sentences to accused witches who confess to practicing 
witchcraft.21  This judicial treatment is contrary to local community 
norms.  Communities often rehabilitate people who confess to 
practicing witchcraft by neutralizing their powers and re-socializing 
them.22   
In South Africa and Zimbabwe, accusations of witchcraft 
brought to courts often come in the form of “imputations” of 
witchcraft.  According to S. v. Mmbengwa, imputing means something 
more than mere naming.23  Imputation “can take any form as long as 
it is clear to the unbiased beholder that the intention to attribute a 
certain characteristic exists in the mind of the imputor which finds 
expression in some act or attitude.”24  Imputations of witchcraft are 
 
 20. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS & GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 169 
(1987).  See KRISHNA VASDEV, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN THE SUDAN (1978), for more 
information on cases involving witchcraft in Sudan. 
 21. These confessions could be coerced, as "[i]t is . . . extremely difficult to get a clear 
picture of how interrogations are conducted by the gendarmes.  No law officer ever admits to 
any beatings or torture.  Yet, some have raised such claims during trials."  FISIY, supra note 6, at 
27. 
 22. FISIY, supra note 6, at 25. 
 23. 1988 (3) SA 71, 73 (VSC). 
 24. Id. at 73. 
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essentially a type of defamation, and they are criminalized in many 
African societies through legislation prohibiting acts of witchcraft.25 
In Tanzania, the courts have reviewed several cases involving the 
killing of alleged witches.  In these cases, defendants employ genuine 
belief in witchcraft as a defense to murder and manslaughter.  In 
other words, defendants argue that the deceased’s threats or actions 
allegedly involving witchcraft are argued to constitute such 
provocation that the defendant killed the deceased in the heat of 
passion.  Part III of this article examines whether judges follow a 
particular standard of reasonableness when deciding these cases. 
Beliefs in witchcraft are prominent on the African continent, and 
witch killings are alarmingly high.  For example, in Tanzania 
approximately four hundred alleged witches were killed between 1997 
and 2000 in the western part of the country, mainly among the 
Sukuma ethnic group.26  Also, reports in other regions “in the western 
part of Tanzania[] show that more than 500 people, most of them 
women, were killed in various witchcraft incidents” over a four-year 
period.27 
The current challenge presented by popular beliefs in witchcraft 
to new normative orientations in Africa is similar to the Western 
experience with witchcraft.  Before the rise of Christianity, beliefs in 
witchcraft existed at the popular level in Europe.  Witchcraft was 
practiced by “cunning folk,” a term for practitioners of “white 
magic.”  This type of witchcraft involved the use of charms and 
supernatural forces for fortune telling, fertility rituals, healing, “the 
casting of spells, the making of storms, converse with spirits, [and] 
 
 25. Under Zimbabwe's Witchcraft Suppression Act, 
Any person who imputes to any other person the use of non-natural means in causing 
any disease in any person or animal or in causing any injury to any person or property, 
that is to say, who names or indicates any other person as being a wizard or witch shall 
be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level six or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine and such imprisonment. 
§3 Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (amended in 2001). 
South Africa's Witchcraft Suppression Act punishes anyone who: "imputes to any other 
person the causing, by supernatural means, of any disease in or injury or damage to any person 
or thing, or who names or indicates any other person as a wizard."  §1(a) Witchcraft 
Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (amended in 1997).  If the imputation of witchcraft results in 
someone being killed, "or where the accused has been proved to be by habit or repute a 
witchdoctor or witch-finder," the accused can be imprisoned "for a period not exceeding twenty 
years."  Id. 
 26. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2000—TANZANIA (on file with Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law). 
 27. Gender and Witchcraft Killings in Tanzania, supra note 18. 
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sympathetic magic.”28  With the rise of Christianity during the Dark 
Ages, popular pagan beliefs in witchcraft were frowned upon and 
suppressed by the church elite.29  During the Middle Ages, religious 
institutions exploited pagan beliefs in witchcraft, constructing an 
“organized, systematic ‘demonology’” that fueled the an anti-witch 
frenzy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.30 
According to H. R. Trevor-Roper, witch-hunts in early modern 
Europe were an attempt by organized religion to control certain 
segments of the population31 by accusing non-conformists of 
practicing witchcraft.32  English colonists brought beliefs in witchcraft 
to New England, location of the infamous Salem Witch Trials, which 
only ended after criticism of the admission of spectral evidence in 
trials,33 and after people of high status were accused.34   
In Africa, norms underlying beliefs in witchcraft pose a 
significant challenge to state legal norms underlying the new 
postcolonial normative orientation towards modernization.  In 
Cameroon, for example, youths practiced a new form of witchcraft 
called gbati, often allegedly “directed against modern elements in the 
village.”35  In one case, the practice was directed at a school, and in 
another case, it was allegedly used to prevent the construction of a 
Protestant church.36  In Cameroon, new trends in beliefs in witchcraft 
demonstrate witchcraft’s perceived “leveling impact,” which 
purportedly reduces inequalities and as a result poses a threat to 
modern forms of authority and wealth.37  Further, in southeastern 
Cameroon, accusations of witchcraft are frequently “the result of the 
 
 28. H.R. TREVOR-ROPER, THE EUROPEAN WITCH-CRAZE OF THE 16TH AND 17TH 
CENTURIES 91 (1978) 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 106–7. 
 32. See id. at 108–9. 
 33. PAUL BOYER & STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, SALEM POSSESSED: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF 
WITCHCRAFT 18–19 (1974). 
 34. See MARION L. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETTS, A MODERN INQUIRY INTO 
THE SALEM WITCH TRIALS 226 (1969). 
 35. Cyprian F. Fisiy & Peter Geschière, Judges and Witches, or How is the State to Deal 
with Witchcraft? Examples from Southeastern Cameroon, 118 CAHIERS D'ÉTUDES AFRICAINES 
135, 141 (1990). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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jealousy and hatred of the rural poor against the younger and more 
advanced urban based elite.”38 
The practice of witchcraft has also been used as a device by the 
elite to obtain and secure authority.  In southeastern Cameroon, the 
elite have employed the fear of witchcraft to emphasize their power 
over others, and they manipulate “witchcraft beliefs, through the 
press and public rumour, to support the otherwise fragile basis of 
[their] authority.”39  In Tanzania, witchcraft has been used by 
“government officials [who] undergo ritual[s] believing that they 
would get rich or secure power especially [while] . . . campaigning for 
the general elections.”40 
II.  SPECTRAL EVIDENCE 
During the Salem Witch Trials in Salem, Massachusetts, 
allegedly possessed girls relied on visions to detect the presence of 
witches among the general populace.  Magistrates admitted these 
visions, or specters, of the alleged witches into evidence to imprison 
accused witches until they were brought to trial before the infamous 
Court of Oyer and Terminer.41  After fasting, prayer, and executions 
failed to stop the flurry of witchcraft accusations, Salem inhabitants 
became uneasy.42  Increase Mather’s published sermon, Cases of 
Conscience: Concerning Evil Spirits Personating Men, criticized the 
use of spectral evidence, and eventually the Court of Oyer and 
Terminer was dissolved and the executions ceased.43  A new court that 
refused to consider spectral evidence tried accused witches remaining 
in prison, and the Salem Witch Trials eventually ended.44 
In Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft, Paul Boyer 
and Stephen Nissenbaum define spectral evidence as “testimony 
about supernatural visitations from some demonic creature . . . who 
 
 38. Cyprian F. Fisiy & Michael J. Rowlands, Sorcery and Law in Modern Cameroon, 6 
CULTURE & HISTORY 63, 70 (1989). 
 39. Id. at 83. 
 40. Witchcraft Notion Creeping in Urban Areas, Dar es Salaam: TOMRIC News Agency, 
June 30, 2000 (on file with Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law). 
 41. See BOYER & NISSENBAUM, supra note 33, at 6; 18–19.  The Court of Oyer and 
Terminer's "trial records have not survived[;] . . .  [therefore,] no one knows how much weight 
[the Court] gave to the spectral testimony gathered by the magistrates in their preliminary 
investigations."  Id. at 19. 
 42. Id. at 19. 
 43. Id. at 19–20. 
 44. Id. at 20. 
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appear[s] in the specter (that is, shape) of an accused witch.”45  A 
diviner, witch doctor, or in the case of the Salem Witch Trials, a 
possessed person, sees the image or specter of an accused witch, and 
this “spectral evidence” is seen as confirming the accused as a witch. 
One of the main characteristics—and problems—of spectral 
evidence is that it cannot be verified, since “specters were usually 
visible only to the person or persons for whom the visitation—vision, 
really—was intended.  Others might be present, but they could see 
nothing.”46  In the late seventeenth century, a Scottish prosecutor 
argued that “[i]t is part of the witches’ purchase from the devil that 
they cannot be seen at some occasions; so that the abominations 
committed then would remain unpunished if such witnesses [who 
offer spectral evidence] were not admitted.”47  Authorities had to 
trust that the possessed person, diviner, or witch doctor did not have 
opportunistic motives for providing the spectral evidence.  They also 
had to trust that the person who provided the spectral evidence did 
not make a mistake when identifying a specter or image. 
It comes as no surprise then that spectral evidence is viewed with 
great skepticism.  For example, during the Salem Witch Trials, 
“magistrates always took pains to buttress [spectral evidence] where 
they could with other, more empirical forms of evidence.”48  The 
admissibility of spectral evidence in cases involving witchcraft during 
the Salem Witch Trials highlights the conflict between popular norms 
and emerging legal norms.  What follows is an examination of spectral 
evidence in African cases involving witchcraft, drawing extensively on 
sources about the Salem Witch Trials and witch trials in Europe, since 
the issue of spectral evidence has not been explicitly discussed in the 
literature on law and witchcraft in Africa.  Part II.A examines the 
potential dangers inherent in the admission of spectral evidence, Part 
II.B examines how judges in African countries have addressed the 
issue of spectral evidence, while Part II.C attempts to provide a 
cogent summary of trends in judges’ reasoning vis-à-vis spectral 
evidence. 
 
 45. Id. at 16. 
 46. Id. at 17. 
 47. James B. Thayer, Trial by Jury of Things Supernatural, in LEGAL ESSAYS 348 (Ezra 
Ripley Thayer ed., 1908). 
 48. BOYER & NISSENBAUM, supra note 33, at 18. 
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A. Dangers of Spectral Evidence 
Spectral evidence is an unverifiable, intangible, and metaphysical 
type of evidence.  If judges give significant weight to spectral evidence 
when deciding cases, they are essentially placing the fate of an 
accused in the hands of a witch doctor or possessed person.  There is 
no way to ensure that opportunistic motives do not underlie the 
allegedly possessed person or witch doctor’s accusation. 
The principal victim of spectral evidence is an accused witch.  As 
seen below, if convicted of being a witch, an accused witch often faces 
capital punishment, large fines or imprisonment.  If acquitted or 
pardoned, an accused witch often faces ostracism, assault, or death.  
For example, in her 1703 petition to Massachusetts’ General Court, 
Abigail Faulkner states: 
When many were accused and Imprisoned att Salem as Witches 
and some Executed, my selfe was accused by the afflicted, who 
pretended to see me by theire Spectrall Sight (not with theire 
bodily eyes) and that I afflicted them, upon whose accusations (and 
theirs only) I was Examined, Imprisoned, and brought to tryall.  
These being all that gave in any Evidence against me upon Oath, 
yet the Jury . . . brought me in guilty, and the Sentence of Death 
was passed upon me.49 
Fortunately, Faulkner was pardoned because she filed her petition 
during a period when the Salem Witch Trials were ending and 
spectral evidence was no longer being considered in trials.50  
Nevertheless, Faulkner suffered as a result of the accusation made 
against her.  In her petition, she states: 
The pardon having Soe farr had its Effect as that I am yet suffered 
to live, but this only as a Malefactor Convict upon record of the 
most heinous Crimes that mankind Can be Supposed to be guilty 
of.  Which besides its utter Ruining and Defaming of my 
Reputation, will Certainly expose my selfe to Imminent Danger by 
New Accusations, which will therby be the more readily believed, 
[and] will Remaine as a perpetual brand of Infamy upon my 
family.51 
Faulkner’s petition provides a telling case study of how an accusation 
of witchcraft often harms the reputation of an accused and is 
instructive in our analysis of modern witchcraft controversies in 
Africa. 
 
 49. CAROL F. KARLSEN, THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT OUTBREAK OF 1692 (manuscript at 35, 
on file with author). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (manuscript at 35–36, on file with author). 
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In southeastern Cameroon, the admission of spectral evidence in 
cases involving witchcraft often results in accused witches receiving 
harsh sentences of imprisonment and fines.  For example, in a case in 
Cameroon’s Bertoua Court of Appeal: 
[A] fairly rich planter . . . felt that all his richness [sic] were of no 
avail.  His investments remained without profit.  He was especially 
worried by the fact that his children, despite all the tuition fees he 
paid, never had success at school.  Therefore, he went to consult a 
witch doctor who saw that a poor neighbour . . . had thrown a spell 
on him.  The planter, supported by the witch doctor, lodged a 
complaint with the gendarmes and the accused, despite all his 
denials, was sentenced to five years of jail.52 
In this case, spectral evidence resulted in the accused witch being 
sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment for an act he denied 
committing.  While the admission of spectral evidence is unusual in 
African courts today, it does occasionally occur. 
B. How Judges Address Spectral Evidence 
1. Zimbabwe.  In the case S. v. Muleya & Others, a group of 
family members appealed their fifteen- and twenty-year prison 
sentences, following their conviction for murder.53  In this case, three 
young children died in “quick succession in unexplained 
circumstances.”54  Their mother, Juliet Munkuli, consulted an alleged 
spirit medium to determine the cause of her children’s deaths.  The 
spirit medium held up a mirror.  According to the spirit medium, the 
image of a male villager appeared in her mirror “carrying the corpse 
of one of the dead children.  Two further corpses of Juliet’s children 
also appeared in [the spirit medium’s] mirror . . . .”55 
Juliet’s relatives gathered with other villagers to confront the 
man whose image had supposedly appeared in the mirror.  At the 
gathering, the man admitted that he had caused the death of Juliet’s 
children by witchcraft.  Juliet’s relatives demanded that he bring them 
the muti (or charm) that he had used to kill the children.  Escorted by 
Juliet’s relatives, the man went home to fetch the muti, and he later 
returned to the gathering with his hands bound behind his back, 
dragging a sledge.  One of Juliet’s relatives was not satisfied that the 
 
 52. Fisiy & Geschière, supra note 35, at 143 (first emphasis added) (case citation not 
provided by authors). 
 53. 1982 (2) ZLR 359 (SC). 
 54. Id. at 360. 
 55. Id. at 361. 
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man had disclosed all his muti, and the relative “demanded that the 
[man] produce a certain water bag whose existence was denied by 
[the man].”56  The man was then forced to lie on his back, his sledge 
was placed on top of him, along with heavy rocks and soon after he 
was pronounced dead.57 
In this case, the claim that the victim’s image had appeared in the 
spirit medium’s mirror constituted spectral evidence.  The judge 
commented that the spectral evidence was “mind-boggling and 
remains unexplained,”58 and he viewed it with apparent confusion and 
perplexity.  While the judge did not believe that the spectral evidence 
was legitimate or credible, he did not explicitly dismiss it from 
consideration.  The judge chose not to delve into the issue of spectral 
evidence, instead opting to leave it “unexplained.”59 
2. South Africa.  In R. v. Hlupo,60 a defendant appealed his 
conviction and sentence for violating South Africa’s Witchcraft 
Suppression Act by imputing the use of witchcraft to residents of his 
village.  Based on a statement by his daughter shortly before her 
death, the defendant believed that the death was caused by an act of 
witchcraft committed by a group of women.61  The defendant 
arranged a meeting, and ordered his sons to tell the village gathering 
what his daughter told him.  At the meeting, a village headman 
accused the women of being witches based on the defendant’s claims 
and ordered them to leave the village.62 
Although the judge in Hlupo dismissed the defendant’s appeal of 
his conviction, he permitted the defendant to appeal his sentence.  
The judge determined that the defendant believed his daughter’s 
statements to be true63 and concluded “that the [defendant] adopted 
as his own the imputation of witchcraft which his dying daughter 
made, and he adopted it with the object of getting the [accused 
women] declared to be witches at this public meeting; and in fact they 
were so declared to be witches.”64 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 361–62. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 1969 (4) SA 98, 99 (R., A.D.) 
 61. Id. at 100. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 101. 
FINAL DIWAN.DOC 3/8/2005  9:44 AM 
364 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:351 
Although the judge did not explicitly address the use of spectral 
evidence by the defendant’s daughter, he recognized that the 
defendant believed his daughter’s accusation: 
[I]f the whole background of this case is taken into account—the 
fact that the [defendant] appears to be a simple tribesman who 
genuinely believed that his daughter had been killed by these 
witches—then I think . . . that the chances of an appeal against 
sentence succeeding are significantly good.65 
Thus, the judge indirectly considered spectral evidence by allowing 
the defendant to appeal his sentence, because the defendant 
“appeare[d] to be a simple tribesman” who believed his daughter’s 
statement that the accused women were witches. 
Spectral evidence also appears in an earlier case reported in the 
South Africa Law Reports, R. v. Maruberera.66  In this instance, the 
accused, an alleged witch doctor, was convicted of unlawfully 
imputing the use of witchcraft to a man named Sigumba.67  Sigumba 
had consulted the witch doctor in an effort to find out the cause of his 
grandchild’s death.  The witch doctor claimed he had a vision of a 
spirit that emerged from Sigumba who killed the grandchild.  As a 
means to appease the spirit and cause it to disappear, the witch doctor 
encouraged Sigumba to slaughter a goat at the site of the grandchild’s 
death.  Apparently distressed at the notion that he was somehow 
responsible for his grandchild’s death, Sigumba was found dead of an 
apparent suicide the day after consulting the witch doctor.  As a 
result, the state prosecuted the witch doctor for making an unlawful 
imputation of witchcraft against Sigumba. 
The judge set aside the witch doctor’s conviction and sentence.  
The judge reviewed the evidence recounting the witch doctor’s 
alleged vision describing the death of Sigumba’s grandchild and found 
“that it was the spirit of Sigumba that had killed the child, and, so far 
from indicating an identity between the spirit and Sigumba, [the witch 
doctor] did rather the opposite.”68  The judge referred to the witch 
doctor’s statements encouraging Sigumba to slaughter the goat as a 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. 1968 (1) SA 206 (R.). 
 67. A witch is a female practitioner of witchcraft and a wizard is a male practitioner of 
witchcraft. S. v. Mafunisa, 1986 (3) SA 495, 499 (VSC).  See id. for a discussion of the difference 
between the terms wizard and witch.  Some of the cases the author located do not use the word 
wizard when referring to a male practitioner of witchcraft.  For the sake of convenience, the 
author will use the word "witch" when referring to both male and female practitioners of 
witchcraft. 
 68. Maruberera, 1968 (1) SA at 207. 
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means to vanquish the evil spirit, stating: “This, I think, indicates the 
lack of identity between the spirit and Sigumba, and the lack of any 
active use of non-natural means by Sigumba.  It was not even said 
that Sigumba was at fault in having failed earlier to appease the 
spirit.”69 
After analyzing the witch doctor’s description of his conversation 
with Siguma and his alleged vision, the judge determined that 
“although it may be some indication that Sigumba’s primitive mind 
took the imputation as one of witchcraft, and even one of 
responsibility for the child’s death, it is of itself insufficient to bring 
the charge home to the [witch doctor].”70  Thus, the witch doctor was 
only morally responsible for the Sigumba’s death.  The judge believed 
it was tragic that Sigumba felt responsible for his grandchild’s death, 
because his “primitive mind” misinterpreted the spectral evidence to 
mean that he and the spirit shared an identity, but he did not find the 
witch doctor legally culpable for Sigumba’s death.71  While it appears 
that the judge in this case believed that he had to interpret spectral 
evidence to make his decision, he was either unwilling, or did not 
consider, bringing in an expert on matters of witchcraft to interpret 
such spectral evidence. 
3. Tanzania.  In the civil case K. Hassani v. Kithuku & Chali, 
the plaintiff, an elderly man named Karoyo Hassani, sought damages 
for slander by an alleged local witch doctor.72  The defendant had 
publicly accused Hassani of practicing witchcraft in front of a large 
crowd of assembled villagers. The alleged witch doctor had led the 
group to Hassani’s house,73 where he publicly announced: “I will talk 
about your wizardry so that the people may know about it as well.”74  
The witch doctor claimed: 
that there was a pot in the house which contained witchcraft; that 
there was a second pot with two edges in the bed room [sic]; that 
the said two edges used to turn into venomous or deadly snakes 
which bit people; that there was a small drum in the roof which was 
made of female genitals; that its drum stick [sic] was a penis; and 
that its purpose was for summoning all witches and wizards.75 
 
 69. Id. at 208. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 1985 TLR 212 (HC). 
 73. Id. at 214. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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The witch doctor also claimed that “the rice which [Hassani] was 
preparing and feeding to people during Maulid celebrations was no 
rice at all; it was goats’ droppings, and the meat was not beef at all but 
meat of baboons and hyenas.”76  Hassani gave the witch doctor 
permission to remove the alleged objects from his house, but the 
witch doctor said, “circumstances were not favourable;” and that he 
would return the next day.77  The witch doctor then dispersed the 
crowd and told them to return the next day.   
The judge awarded Hassani 25,000 Tanzanian shillings in general 
damages.  The judge found the witch doctor defamed Hassani by 
claiming that Hassani practiced witchcraft and maintained the 
accoutrements of witchcraft in his dwelling.  The judge found the 
witch doctor’s words were “likely to expose [Hassani] to hatred, 
ridicule, or contempt or calculated to injure him in his social standing 
in his community.78  Thus, the judge viewed the witch doctor’s words 
as placing Hassani at risk of potential harm or death, stressing that 
the incident “reveals a somewhat disgusting and absolutely 
nauseating episode.”79  Thus, the judge in Hassani addressed the 
spectral evidence seriously; rather than openly questioning its 
accuracy, he chose to focus on its potential for causing harm.  Within 
the context of Hassani’s village, such an utterance was seen as 
creating a hostile, and potentially dangerous, environment. 
4. Cameroon.  The following case provides an intriguing 
example of the weight given spectral evidence by magistrates in 
southeastern Cameroon.  When deciding cases involving accusations 
of witchcraft, Cameroonian judges tend to rely heavily on spectral 
evidence provided in the testimony of witch doctors.80  In Affaire 
Medang Jacques & Mpome Moïse c/ Ministère Publique Mpel 
Mathurin & Baba Denis,81 the inhabitants of a village “were terrified 
by . . . numerous inexplicable deaths . . . , failure in school, and the 
strange noises that were coming from [a villager’s] residence.”82  A 
renowned witch doctor, Baba Denis, was invited to detect the source 
of the misfortunes that plagued the village.  Based on his own visions, 
 
 76. Id. at 215. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 216. 
 79. Id. at 213. 
 80. See FISIY, supra note 6, at 14. 
 81. FISIY, supra note 6, at 12–13 (discussing Affaire Medang Jacques & Mpome Moïse c/ 
Ministère Publique Mpel Mathurin & Baba Denis, Arrêt No. 8/COR du 04.10.1983). 
 82. FISIY, supra note 6, at 12. 
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the witch doctor accused two villagers of using witchcraft to cause the 
calamities in the village.  He led the frightened inhabitants of the 
village to the first accused villager’s residence 
in order to unmask witchcraft objects.  Brandishing a charcoal 
pressing iron full of fire in his left hand, [the witch doctor] recited 
his incantations in a bid to locate the objects in question.  In the 
process, he designated [the first accused villager’s] bed as 
containing some of the objects.  There, a parcel containing hair 
from a panther’s upper lip was found, enough to decimate an entire 
village.83 
According to the witch doctor, 
the unexplained noises were caused by mystical planes taking off 
and landing on a mystical landing strip in [the first accused 
villager’s] house.  [The first accused villager] used these ‘aeronefs 
magiques’ with his accomplices to reek [sic] havoc in the 
neighbourhood and the neighbouring village. . . . [I]n his bid to 
neutralize the landing strip, [the witch doctor] was mystically 
attacked by [the first accused villager].  Suddenly, [the witch 
doctor] realized that his strength had been drained away.  He 
almost collapsed and was helped away limping.  Later in the day, he 
proudly claimed that he had only survived this . . . attack by 
defeating [the first accused villager] in their mystical fight.84 
The second accused villager allegedly used “hair from a 
panther’s upper lip, enough to decimate an entire village,” to kill the 
village school’s headmaster.85  A schoolboy found the panther hair 
and presented it to the witch doctor, who claimed that his 
incantations had caused the boy to find the hair.86 
Based on the Baba Denis’ testimony and supported by the 
physical evidence of the panther’s hair, the two accused villagers were 
convicted of practicing witchcraft, in violation of Section 251 of the 
Cameroon Penal Code.  Both defendants were sentenced to five years 
imprisonment and fined 30,000 francs.  The first accused villager was 
sentenced to pay an additional 40,000 francs in damages to the witch 
doctor.87 
 The trial of the accused villagers took place in an inquisitorial 
civil forum, and the judge appeared to seriously consider the witch 
doctor’s spectral testimony without taking into account the accused 
villagers’ arguments to the contrary.  According to legal 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 13. 
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anthropologist Cyprian F. Fisiy, in southeastern Cameroon “[t]he 
judge has as his ultimate guide his conscience—l’intime conviction du 
juge (the firm conviction of the judge).  When he is satisfied that a 
good case has been established, he will not hesitate to convict the 
defendant”88 in cases alleging the criminalized practice of witchcraft.  
Indeed, witch doctors play a pivotal role in cases involving 
accusations of witchcraft, and “[t]heir assertions, especially when 
backed by material evidence . . . are readily accepted by the Courts . . 
. [located in southeastern Cameroon].”89  In Baba Denis, the judge 
viewed the witch doctor’s evidence as conclusive, without considering 
the witch doctor’s possible opportunistic motives for making 
accusations of witchcraft and providing spectral evidence.  According 
to Fisiy, “the competence [of witch doctors] is relative and depends 
on the apparent gain to be obtained from making or not making such 
accusations.  For the courts to accept their evidence without critical 
scrutiny might be very dangerous for the rights of the accused.”90  This 
case is similar to Abigail Faulkner’s petition discussed earlier in Part 
II.A, in which the trial judge relied heavily on spectral evidence 
provided by an “afflicted” witness describing subconscious visions in 
arriving at his decision that the accused was a witch.91 
C. Summary 
These cases provide a snapshot that, with the exception of 
southeastern Cameroon, African judges tend to view spectral 
evidence with a jaundiced eye, and they generally try to avoid 
interpreting it.  Certain judges in southeastern Cameroon, where 
witchcraft norms continue to remain prevalent, generally continue to 
consider spectral evidence in their decisions.92  By readily accepting 
this spectral evidence, southeastern Cameroonian judges have chosen 
to subordinate state legal norms to norms underlying popular beliefs 
in local cultures where witchcraft beliefs remain prevalent.   
III.  REASONABLENESS AND PROVOCATION 
In cases involving witchcraft, defendants often claim a  “heat of 
passion” defense to homicide charges, arguing that they acted to 
 
 88. Id. at 31 (translation by author). 
 89. Id. at 13. 
 90. Id. at 14. 
 91. KARLSEN, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 92. See FISIY, supra note 6, at 31. 
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protect themselves against the allegedly provocative behavior of an 
accused witch.  Defendants argue their provocation was reasonable, 
and that consequently,  their actions should be excused.  Judges 
consider the reasonableness of the defendants’ perceptions by asking 
whether a reasonable person would have perceived the context of the 
action as the defendant did.  As such, “reasonableness” becomes a 
window into the way judges balance norms underlying popular beliefs 
and state legal norms. 
A. Provocation in the Common Law 
In the sixteenth century, criminal law formally acknowledged 
“homicides committed in the course of a sudden quarrel were less 
culpable than more deliberate felonious homicides.”93  In 1628, types 
of homicide were distinguished.  Murder was defined as being 
committed with malice aforethought, and manslaughter as being 
committed in the “heat of passion caused by adequate provocation.”94  
Provocation is defined as “[s]omething (such as words or actions) that 
arouses anger or animosity in another, causing that person to respond 
in the heat of passion.  ‘Adequate’ provocation can reduce a murder 
charge to voluntary manslaughter.”95 
In the mid-eighteenth century, the law of provocation “reflected 
community norms or value judgments as to the relative degrees of 
moral culpability to be assigned to offenders depending upon the 
circumstances in which they had lost self-control.”96  These value 
judgments focused on the defendant’s state of mind and the situation 
in which the homicide occurred.97  In the mid-nineteenth century, 
judgments about what constituted provocation were seen “as a 
question of law to be determined by the judge.”98  However, in 
“borderline cases . . . judges began to leave the hard questions to the 
jury.”99  The twentieth century “witnessed a progressive relaxation” in 
judges making most of the value judgments, with the jury deciding the 
borderline cases.100  Thus, “the reasonable man made his appearance 
 
 93. Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A 
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 446 (1981). 
 94. Id. 
 95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (7th ed. 1999). 
 96. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 93, at 447. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See E.O. Isedonmwen, A Requiem for Provocation?, 32 J. OF AFR. L. 194, 197 (1988). 
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in the criminal law.”101  The reasonable man test was developed to 
help juries make decisions in borderline cases.  The reasonable man 
was allegedly “universal, classless, sexless,” and reflective of 
community norms.102  In the early twentieth century, the reasonable 
man was “a paragon of excellence both physically and mentally.”103  
As seen in the British case Director of Public Prosecutions v. 
Camplin,104 this trend toward reasonableness continued through the 
late twentieth century; however, the reasonable man standard has 
become much more subjective. 
In Camplin, the House of Lords held “[f]or the purposes of the 
law of provocation the ‘reasonable man’ was not confined to the adult 
male; the expression meant an ordinary person of either sex, not 
exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such powers 
of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens 
will exercise in society as it was today.”105  Further, “the ‘reasonable 
man’ is a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an 
ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused but in other 
respects sharing such of the accused’s characteristics . . . [that] would 
affect the gravity of the provocation to [the accused].”106  One must 
not only ask whether a reasonable person “would in like 
circumstances be provoked to lose his self-control, but would also 
react to the provocation as the accused did.”107  Expanding on this 
concept, one could argue when a traditional African who genuinely 
believes in witchcraft is provoked by a threat of harm by witchcraft, 
he or she could be reasonably provoked.  The greater the 
provocation, the more likely a person would lose self-control and 
react in a fit of rage. 
In theory, a trier of fact could use a reasonable traditional 
African standard when deciding cases involving witchcraft in which 
the defense of provocation is raised, however, it is unlikely that a 
defendant accused of killing a person in reaction to a provocative act 
based on witchcraft would have his or her punishment reduced simply 
because killing a witch is encouraged in the defendant’s community.  
Nevertheless, one could argue that the defendant could have his or 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 93, at 448. 
 103. Isedonmwen, supra note 100, at 198. 
 104. 1978 (2) All E.R. 168 (H.L.). 
 105. Id. at 168. 
 106. Id. at 169. 
 107. Id. 
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her conviction reduced from murder to manslaughter if the judge 
takes into account that a reasonable person from the defendant’s 
community would have acted in the same manner. 
According to Ugandan legal scholar Daniel D. N. Nsereko, 
[p]rovided that there is an overt physical act of witchcraft, the 
courts are at least willing to accept an ordinary person of the 
community and background of the accused as the standard for 
determining whether or not an act of witchcraft would be sufficient 
to deprive a reasonable person of self-control and to induce him to 
commit the offence [killing out of provocation] in question.108 
Thus, the general trend is for a subjective standard of reasonableness 
to be followed in cases involving witchcraft in which the defense of 
provocation is raised.  Nsereko concludes that a genuine belief in 
witchcraft can 
be a partial defence to a murder charge where there has been an 
overt and physically provocative act on the part of the victim, to 
which the accused retaliates on sudden impulse.  This defence is 
rarely successfully invoked because witchcraft, being a 
metaphysical phenomenon, does not usually manifest itself in overt 
physical acts.109 
While there are very few materials available to examine the doctrine 
of provocation in the context of witchcraft, the following section 
discusses some African cases where the threat of harm by witchcraft 
can be seen as a legitimate provocative act. 
B. Cases 
Examining the defense of provocation in cases involving 
witchcraft shows whether judges consider witchcraft a mitigating 
factor in their decisions.  The extent to which judges consider 
witchcraft a mitigating factor depends on whether their reasoning 
follows an objective (reasonable person) or subjective (reasonable 
traditional African) standard.  The reasonableness of a defendant’s 
provocation can make a significant difference in the defendant’s 
conviction and sentence, however, “idiosyncrasies of individual 
temperament or mentality that make a man more easily provoked, or 
more violent in his response to provocation, ought not . . . to affect his 
liability to conviction, although they may justify mitigation of 
sentence.”110  The defense of provocation “merely recognizes the 
 
 108. Daniel D. N. Nsereko, Witchcraft as a Criminal Defence, From Uganda to Canada and 
Back, 24 MANITOBA L.J. 38, 55 (1996). 
 109. Id. at 59. 
 110. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report, Cmd. 8932, para. 143 (1953). 
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frailty of man and his proneness to lose self-control under certain 
circumstances and thus to do things which he otherwise would not 
do.”111 
1. Colonial Cases.  In Rex. v. Emilio Lumu,112 a soldier appealed 
his conviction for murder.  The soldier’s two-year-old nephew died in 
his arms after suffering from a brief illness.  The soldier’s sister 
reported that his father-in-law, a reputed witch doctor named 
Sempogo, had fed the child a black powder, which she believed was 
“witchcraft medicine” that had killed the child.  Upon hearing this, 
the soldier went to Sempogo’s home and stabbed him to death. 
The court acknowledged the soldier’s genuine belief in 
witchcraft, however, it could not “find any support for the proposition 
that the excuse of legal provocation could be extended so as to apply 
to the facts of this case on the basis that [the soldier] honestly 
believed that [Sempogo] had bewitched the child [by feeding it the 
black powder] and caused its death.”113  Instead, the court assumed 
Sempogo “poisoned the child by natural means.”114  Since Sempogo 
poisoned the child in the soldier’s absence, two days before the 
soldier killed Sempogo, Sempogo’s act did not constitute legal 
provocation.  The court upheld the soldier’s conviction for murder 
and rejected his defense of provocation because, according to the 
Uganda Penal Code, the provocative act had to be done “in the 
presence of an ordinary person . . . who is under [the soldier’s] 
immediate care or to whom [the soldier] stands in a conjugal, 
parental, filial, or paternal relation.”115 
African legal scholars Onesmus K. Mutungi and Daniel D. N. 
Nsereko both agree Rex. v. Fabiano Kinene & Another116 “is one of 
the few cases in which belief in witchcraft was held to constitute legal 
provocation.”117  In this case, a group of villagers suspected a village 
headman named William of using witchcraft to kill their relatives.  
One night, they found William crawling naked in their compound, 
and fearing he was attempting to bewitch them, they killed him by 
 
 111. Nsereko, supra note 108, at 50–51. 
 112. 1946 (13) E. Afr. Ct. App. 144 (appeal taken from Uganda). 
 113. Id. at 145. 
 114. Id. at 146. 
 115. Id. at 146 (quoting Section 199 of the Uganda Penal Code). 
 116. 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. 96 (appeal taken from Uganda). 
 117. Nsereko, supra note 108, at 53; see also MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at 42 (noting "this was 
the first instance where a belief in witchcraft fulfilled the legal tenets of provocation"). 
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forcibly inserting “about twenty raw green bananas into his anus.”118  
According to the court, William’s act of crawling naked in the 
villagers’ compound at night, and their belief that he was trying to 
bewitch them, constituted “grave and sudden provocation.”119  The 
court stated: 
We think that if the facts proved establish that the victim was 
performing in the actual presence of [the villagers] some act which 
[they] did genuinely believe, and which an ordinary person of the 
community to which [they] belong[] would genuinely believe, to be 
an act of witchcraft against him or another person under his 
immediate care . . . he might be angered to such an extent as to be 
deprived of the power of self-control and induced to assault the 
person doing the act of witchcraft.  And if this be the case, a 
defence of grave and sudden provocation is open to him.”120 
This case explicitly refers to the reasonableness of a defendant’s 
belief in witchcraft.  It finds the villagers’ provocation by an apparent 
act of witchcraft to be reasonable, provided an ordinary and 
reasonable person from the villagers’ community would share the 
same belief. 
In the colonial precedent-setting case Eria Galikuwa v. Rex, the 
defendant appealed his conviction for murder.121  The defendant had 
hired a reputed witch doctor in the hopes of recovering money stolen 
from him.  The witch doctor was “an unscrupulous rogue who saw in 
[the defendant’s] credulity an opportunity for unjust enrichment.”122  
The witch doctor demanded exorbitant fees that the defendant could 
not afford, but which he promised to pay in a few days.  The witch 
doctor threatened his witchcraft medicine would “eat [the defendant] 
up” if he did not pay.123  Later, the defendant claimed he heard death 
threats emanating from the witch doctor’s medicine.124  As a result, 
the defendant killed the witch doctor by beating him with a stick. 
The court rejected the defendant’s defense of provocation, 
because “a mere threat to cause injury to health or even death in the 
near future cannot be considered as a physical, provocative act.”125  
The defendant’s fear of, and genuine belief in, witchcraft was not 
 
 118. Kinene, 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. at 98. 
 119. Kinene, 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. at 101. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 1951 (18) E. Afr. Ct. App. 175 (appeal taken from Uganda). 
 122. Id. at 175–76. 
 123. Id. at 176. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 178. 
FINAL DIWAN.DOC 3/8/2005  9:44 AM 
374 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:351 
enough for the court to find his provocation reasonable.  The court 
found he “was motivated not by anger but by fear alone.  He struck, 
not in the heat of passion, but in despair arising from the recognition 
of his inability to raise the money demanded and his hopeless fear of 
the consequences . . . he was not suddenly deprived of his self-
control”126 
According to the court, the following elements are required for a 
successful defense of provocation: 
1. [T]he act causing the death must be proved to have been done 
in the heat of passion, that is in anger: fear alone, even fear of 
immediate death is not enough. 
2. [T]he victim [must have been] . . . performing in the actual 
presence of the accused some act which the accused did 
genuinely believe, and which an ordinary person of the 
community to which the accused belongs would genuinely 
believe, to be an act of witchcraft against him or another person 
under his immediate care. 
3. A belief in witchcraft per se does not constitute a circumstance 
of excuse or mitigation for killing a person believed to be a 
witch or wizard when there is no immediate provocative act. 
4. The provocative act must amount to a criminal offence under 
[c]riminal [l]aw. 
5. The provocation must be not only grave but sudden and the 
killing have been done in the heat of passion. 127 
2. Postcolonial Cases.  In the Tanzanian case Joseph 
Kamiliango & Five Others v. R., four sisters arranged for an alleged 
witch doctor to kill their other sister, Martina Adolf, who they 
believed had used witchcraft to kill members of their family and to 
make their father ill.128  Martina was brutally murdered, her body was 
found with “a cut wound on the back of the head,” and her breasts, 
genitals, and appendages had been mutilated.129  The four sisters 
argued they had “acted under provocation arising out of their firm 
belief that [Martina] was practicing witchcraft and was determined to 
finish them off.”130  The appellate court judge found that Martina had 
not provoked her four sisters, because they had the opportunity to 
deliberate about how to kill her, after which they hired a witch doctor 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 176–78. 
 128. 1983 TLR 185 (CA). 
 129. Id. at 187. 
 130. Id. at 189. 
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as an accomplice.  Thus, the four sisters acted “with cool minds and in 
full possession of their faculties.”131  The judge did not discuss the 
reasonableness of the four sisters’ belief in witchcraft, and he 
dismissed the appeal of their convictions for murder outright. 
In the Tanzanian case John N. Rudowiki v. Republic, the 
defendant appealed his conviction for murder and his death sentence 
for killing his grandfather.132  The defendant’s grandfather had come 
to the defendant’s home and “threatened to kill him by witchcraft, 
following which [the defendant] picked up an axe” and killed his 
grandfather.133  The defendant maintained he had a genuine belief in 
witchcraft, because “[o]n a number of occasions [he] had consulted 
witchdoctors who told him that [his grandfather] had killed a number 
of people in the family and had caused temporary sterility of his own 
daughter through witchcraft, and on being asked [his grandfather 
had] confirmed this.”134 
The appellate court judge reduced the defendant’s conviction to 
manslaughter and reduced his death sentence to twelve to a prison 
term of twelve years.  The judge found the defendant had been 
shocked by his grandfather’s threat, especially in light of his 
grandfather’s confession to have killed and caused misfortune to 
several family members.135  The judge did not explicitly state whether 
provocation based on a death threat that involves witchcraft was 
reasonable, however, by taking into account the defendant’s genuine 
belief in witchcraft, and the accused party’s perception of his 
grandfather’s threat as real, the judge found the defendant was 
reasonably provoked.136  According to the judge, the killing in this 
case “was rooted in the belief of witchcraft which ought to be 
discouraged.  This was a bad case of manslaughter which came very 
near murder, and which calls for a severe sentence.”137 
In the Tanzanian case Herman Nyigo v. Republic, the defendant 
appealed his conviction for murdering a person named Musa 
Chatila.138  The defendant had gone to a tavern (pombe shop), where, 
without warning, he killed Chatila by attacking him with a bamboo 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. 1991 TLR 102 (CA). 
 133. Id. at 103. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 105. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at 106. 
 138. 1995 TLR 178 (CA). 
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stick while Chatila was talking to another person.  A witness heard 
the defendant tell Chatila: “I am killing you because of your 
sorcery.”139 
The appellate court judge rejected the defendant’s appeal for a 
lesser conviction and denied his defense of provocation.  The judge 
agreed with the lower court, which had determined that provocation 
was not involved because the defendant attacked Chatila without a 
“quarrel or fight, in an unprovoked manner.”140 
The judge wrote: “The [defendant’s] utterances that he was 
killing [Chatila] because of sorcery is in our view a clear 
manifestation of malice aforethought.”141  The judge did not attempt 
to determine if the defendant had a genuine belief in witchcraft.  If 
the judge’s reasoning followed a reasonable traditional African 
standard, he might have viewed the defendant’s belief in witchcraft as 
a mitigating factor in the case, especially if killing a witch was seen as 
a praiseworthy service to the community as a whole, as discussed 
above.142 
These postcolonial Tanzanian cases are largely consistent with 
trends in Ugandan law.  The Uganda Penal Code’s requirement that 
provocation be sudden prevents defendants from using the defense of 
provocation in situations where “killers of the so-called witches take 
considerable time brooding and nursing suspicions against their 
victims.  The victims, for their part, often say no word or do no overt 
act to the accused that the law would recognize as sudden 
provocation.”143 
In reference to provocation, the Uganda Penal Code “requires 
some physical and overt act or insult that is capable of derailing a 
person’s fortitude and power of self-control and likely to induce him 
to retaliate by killing the person who offers it.  Metaphysical 
phenomena, such as fears of witchcraft, are not such acts.”144  Thus, a 
defendant who kills someone out of a genuine fear that the deceased 
had bewitched him or her would not likely be able to avail himself or 
herself of the defense of provocation in Uganda.  It appears that 
Ugandan law encourages judges to find that a genuine fear of 
witchcraft does not constitute provocation.  This is consistent with the 
 
 139. Id. at 179. 
 140. Id. at 180. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Supra note 9, and accompanying text. 
 143. Nsereko, supra note 108, at 52. 
 144. Id. 
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colonial case Eria Galikuwa, which held that an “act causing . . . death 
must be proved to have been done in the heat of passion, that is in 
anger: fear alone, even fear of immediate death is not enough” to 
constitute provocation. 
C. Summary 
The colonial era cases, discussed in Part III.B.1 above, come 
from a period between the 1940s and 1950s and generally suggest that 
when conventional defenses such as provocation are used by 
defendants, they have generally been rejected by the courts.  The 
postcolonial cases, discussed in Part III.B.2 above, generally come 
from the 1980s and 1990s.  In the postcolonial era, judges seem to 
have followed the colonial case Eria Galikuwa145 by allowing the 
alleged appearance of witchcraft to count as provocation as long as 
the killing is not premeditated, is sudden and is not based solely on 
fear. 
Trends in judges’ reasoning have followed the development of 
the common law doctrine of provocation, since defendants are not 
acquitted due to their beliefs in witchcraft, but rather their 
convictions are sometimes reduced from murder to manslaughter, 
and their sentences are adjusted accordingly.  Since the late 1950s, 
taunts unaccompanied by violence could constitute provocation in the 
common law.146  Trends in cases involving witchcraft have followed a 
similar path; since Kinene147 (1941) and Eria Galikuwa148 (1951), non-
physical acts have been considered adequate provocation under very 
restricted circumstances. 
IV.  IMPUTATIONS OF WITCHCRAFT 
Legal reasoning in the common law tradition places significant 
importance on the concept of reasonableness, or what is “[f]air, 
proper, or moderate under the circumstances.”149  In common law, the 
concept of reasonableness appears in both the civil and criminal 
branches of the law.  In civil law, the reasonable person standard is 
used as “a test of liability for negligence,” and defendants’ conduct is 
often measured according to “reasonable care” or the “degree of care 
 
 145. 1951 (18) E. Afr. Ct. App. 175 (appeal taken from Uganda). 
 146. See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, 1978 (2) All E.R. 168, 172–73 (H.L.). 
 147. 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. 96 (appeal taken from Uganda). 
 148. Eria Galikuwa, 1951 (18) E. Afr. Ct. App. 175 (appeal taken from Uganda). 
 149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (7th ed. 1999). 
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that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of 
business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”150  
A reasonable person is a person who “acts sensibly, does things 
without serious delay, and takes proper but not excessive 
precautions.”151  The reasonable person standard also appears in 
criminal law.  Reasonableness was mentioned as early as 1803 in the 
criminal law doctrine of self-defense,152 and in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the reasonable man appeared in the law of provocation.153  
As seen in Part III.A above, the reasonable person standard is an 
important part of the modern law of provocation. 
According to Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., the development of the 
reasonable person standard “is generally thought to have been 
necessitated by the difficulty of applying a constantly changing 
standard based on individual capabilities and limitations, and the 
need of those who live in society to expect and require that all others 
behave, to some minimal extent, in a prescribed way.”154  The 
reasonable person “possess[es] and exercis[es] those qualities of 
attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment that . . . society 
require[s] of its members for the protection of their own interests and 
the interests of others.”155  The personification of reasonableness in 
the law helps to “constrain judicial decision-making by forcing judges 
to consider the societal consensus embodied in the concept of 
reasonableness when deriving results.”156 
What follows is an analysis of judicial reasoning in cases 
involving accusations or imputations of witchcraft.  Generally, a 
plaintiff claims that he or she suffered injury due to an accusation that 
he or she is using witchcraft.  Outside of Africa these cases tend to fall 
under the law of defamation, but in South Africa and Zimbabwe such 
imputations are criminal and judges generally seem to apply a 
reasonableness standard in assessing injury. 
 
 150. Id. at 204. 
 151. Id. at 1273. 
 152. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 93, at 443. 
 153. Id. at 447. 
 154. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report 
on the "Odious Creature", 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410, 414 (1970). 
 155. Elmo Schwab, The Quest for the Reasonable Man, 45 TEX. B.J. 178, 178 (1982). 
 156. Robert Unikel, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in 
American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 329 (1992). 
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A. Background 
Before examining cases involving imputations of witchcraft from 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is instructive to examine why 
defamation is criminalized in these cases.  Defamation is part of tort 
law, otherwise known as the law of delict in the mixed common law 
and Roman-Dutch legal systems in southern Africa.157  A delict is “a 
wrong looked at from the individual’s point of view . . . [that] seeks to 
regulate the relationships between individuals.”158  A crime “is a 
wrong viewed from the perspective of the State.”159  Imputations of 
witchcraft are criminalized in both South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s 
Witchcraft Suppression Acts.160 
According to South African legal scholar Jonathan Burchell, in 
Roman-Dutch law private actions were historically penal in nature, 
and “[a]n award of damages for defamation was more like a fine than 
a recompense for the plaintiff.”161  Also, “criminal proceedings for 
injury to reputation [i.e., defamation] were not confined to ‘serious’ 
cases,” and “the Roman-Dutch authorities did not take a clearly 
defined line on whether criminal defamation was confined to the 
more serious cases or not.”162  The Zimbabwean and former 
Rhodesian courts have held that “the ‘seriousness’ of the defamation 
is an element of the offence.”163  Yet in South Africa, it is not clear 
whether defamation must be “serious” in order to fall under criminal 
 
 157. The Roman-Dutch law tradition is the common law tradition of six Southern African 
countries, two of which are South Africa and Zimbabwe.  Roman-Dutch law was brought to 
South Africa and Zimbabwe by the Dutch East India Company, which was given a charter by 
the Estates-General, the highest authority in the Dutch Republic that lasted from 1581–1795.  
As a Dutch possession, the Cape of Good Hope, located in what is now South Africa, received 
the Roman-Dutch law from Dutch settlers. 
From the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
British ruled the Cape, and British settlers brought influences of English law; however, Roman-
Dutch law remained in place.  The Cape system of law was eventually extended to British 
protectorates, one of which was Rhodesia, or what is now Zimbabwe.  Thus, the Roman-Dutch 
law remains a major influence on the common law of South Africa and Zimbabwe.  See 
generally Richard Goldstone, The Reception of the Dutch-Roman Law in Southern Africa and 
Sri Lanka, and its Influence on Civil Liberties, in LAW IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES MEETING, 
JERUSALEM 21–26, 1985 (1989). 
 158. JONATHAN M. BURCHELL, PRINCIPLES OF DELICT 2 (1993). 
 159. Id. 
 160. §1(a) Witchcraft Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (South Africa); §3 Witchcraft 
Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (Zimbabwe). 
 161. JONATHAN A. BURCHELL, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 323 (1985). 
 162. Id. at 325. 
 163. Id. at 326. 
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law.  Indeed, “neither the Roman-Dutch authorities nor the South 
African cases provide an answer to the question whether defamation 
must be ‘serious’ for criminal liability to result.”164 
Further, “[t]he South African and English law of criminal 
defamation were originally influenced by the purpose of preventing a 
breach of the peace.”165  Yet, “[l]ittle attention has been given to the 
tendency of a statement to provoke a breach of the peace in the 
South African authorities on criminal defamation, and a clear 
distinction between ‘seriousness’ and a tendency to lead to a breach 
of the peace has not always been drawn.”166  Burchell argues civil law 
can provide adequate redress of damaged reputation and “the 
criminal law of defamation both [in South Africa] . . . and in England 
is seldom used,” suggesting that “it is too drastic a method for 
controlling speech and expression.”167   
Imputations of witchcraft are certainly serious in the context of 
African societies, where accused witches are often killed.  In many 
African societies murdering a witch is not necessarily seen as a 
deviation from expected behavior.  In such cases, a judge would have 
to take into consideration the genuineness of a defendant’s belief in 
witchcraft and the reasonableness of the defendant’s crime according 
to a reasonable person from the defendant’s community where such 
witchcraft beliefs remain prevalent.  According to Daniel D. N. 
Nsereko, “[i]n Uganda, as is the case in many African countries, 
witches or sorceresses are generally viewed with revulsion, fear, and 
abhorrence.  They are considered to be inhuman and not fit to live.”168  
Therefore, accusing someone of being a witch not only harms his or 
her reputation, it puts his or her life in danger,  thus warranting the 
criminalization of witchcraft imputation.  
In cases involving imputations of witchcraft, reasonableness 
comes into play at two points.  On the one hand, people who 
genuinely believe in witchcraft might find it reasonable to think one 
has an obligation to point out suspected witches.  On the other hand, 
accused witches would suffer injury to their reputations and likely 
physical injury.  A “modern” standard of reasonableness, the 
reasonable person standard, would view accusations of witchcraft as 
foolish and harmless.  Neither imputing the use of witchcraft to 
 
 164. Id. at 327. 
 165. Id. at 330. 
 166. Id. at 330–31. 
 167. Id. at 332. 
 168. Nsereko, supra note 108, at 44. 
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someone nor fearing injury from the community at large after an 
imputation of witchcraft would make sense.  Yet, the law and courts 
in certain African countries take a slightly different view and 
discourage accusations of witchcraft, likely because the state has an 
interest in making people change their beliefs, while at the same time 
recognizing that in communities of believers, such witchcraft 
accusations or imputations can put the accused at risk.   
Traditionally, imputations of witchcraft were not seen as criminal 
in the communities of the parties involved in these cases and the 
parties would have likely resolved their disputes through informal, 
community-based, extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms.  
Indeed, laws prohibiting the imputation of witchcraft are contrary to 
some traditional community norms of what is seen as reasonable 
conduct.  By recognizing that these imputations cause harm in 
communities where witchcraft beliefs are common, judges implicitly 
modify the objective reasonable person standard to incorporate 
traditional community norms. 
In Zimbabwe, the national association of traditional healers 
(Zinatha) challenged the Witchcraft Suppression Act’s punishment 
for the imputation of the use of witchcraft.169  For many years, 
“[m]embers of Zinatha have cried foul that the law [has] impinged 
upon their right to expose evil-doers in their communities.”170  
Zinatha and other groups like it argue that “[i]t is time the Witchcraft 
Suppression Act was revisited and those people who practise 
witchcraft and sorcery should be punished.”171  In Zambia, “[t]he 
Traditional Health Practitioners Association of Zambia (THPAZ) 
urged Government to recognise the existence” of African witchcraft 
and to amend the Witchcraft Act to legalize “witch-hunting.”172 
B. Cases 
The following criminal cases involve instances in which 
defendants are punished for imputing the use of witchcraft.  An 
analysis of these cases will provide insight into whether the reasoning 
 
 169. Mclytton Cleaver, Sunday Opinion: About Crimes and Witches, ZIMBABWE STANDARD 
(Harare), Apr. 12, 1998, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/199804120017.html (on 
file with Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Amend Witchcraft Act, Government Urged, TIMES OF ZAMBIA (Ndola) Apr. 23, 1998, 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/199804230040.html (on file with Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law). 
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of African judges in witchcraft cases appears to follow a particular 
standard of reasonable conduct, and whether any trends can be 
discerned over time and across countries. 
1. Zimbabwe.  In the Zimbabwean case S. v. Bhumu, the 
defendant, a witch doctor, was convicted of violating Section 3 of the 
Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 for imputing the use of witchcraft 
to an elderly woman.173  The witch doctor appealed his sentence of 
eight months’ imprisonment with labor.  The appellate court judge 
dismissed the appeal, holding the sentence was not excessive because 
the defendant was an alleged witch doctor and as a result his 
imputation was seen as particularly harmful, even though no harm to 
anyone resulted from it.  The judge viewed the imputation as 
punishable because 
the consequences of such an imputation can be disastrous for the 
victim.  Very often the unfortunate victim of the imputation is an 
old woman who is then banished from the village, and is driven in 
despair to suicide.  Frequently she is severely assaulted and 
sometimes even killed.  Fortunately for her, these consequences did 
not apparently overtake the complainant in this case, but they 
could very easily have . . . .174 
The judge’s reasoning appears to follow a reasonable traditional 
African standard.  He accepts that imputations of witchcraft made by 
witch doctors cause injury and he acknowledges that an accused witch 
faces immediate danger.  Yet, to a certain extent, the judge’s 
reasoning also follows the reasonable person standard, in that he 
upholds the witch doctor’s conviction for the act of imputing 
witchcraft 
Although judges often acknowledge that imputations of 
witchcraft can cause harm, they generally dismiss actions not 
grounded in actual harm.  For example, in the Zimbabwean case S. v. 
Pivisayi, the defendant, claimed that a woman used “fairies” to harass 
his wife and children.175  The judge overturned the defendant’s 
conviction for imputing the use of witchcraft to the woman, because 
according to the Witchcraft Suppression Act, the imputation must be 
that the person used “non-natural means to cause disease or injury”176 
and the judge held that the act of mere upsetting was not equivalent 
to disease or injury.  Yet, judges seem attentive to local opinion about 
 
 173. 1981 (2) SA 839 (ZAD). 
 174. Id. at 841. 
 175. 1982 (2) ZLR 260 (HC). 
 176. Id. 
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what constitutes reasonable behavior.  In S. v. Ndhlovu, a school 
principal claimed that a man caused a child’s illness (described in the 
opinion as possession by a flock of magical birds).177  The judge found 
the principal’s action to be in violation of the Witchcraft Suppression 
Act, which states: 
Whoever imputes to any other person the use of non-natural means 
in causing any disease in any person or animal or in causing any 
injury to any person or property, that is to say, whoever names or 
indicates any other person as being a wizard or witch shall be guilty 
of an offence.178 
The judge in Ndhlovu determined that the child “was regarded as 
being ill by all concerned” in the controversy, and that given local 
norms regarding witchcraft, injury had in fact resulted from the 
principal’s imputation given local norms.179 
2. South African Conduit Pipe Cases.  The South African cases 
S. v. Nomgca180 and S. v. Mmbengwa & Others181 are similar to the 
cases discussed above, however, the South African cases address 
defendants utilizing the so-called “conduit pipe” defense.  Under this 
defense, by making an imputation of witchcraft, the imputor allegedly 
acts as a mere “conduit pipe” or conveyor of information for 
someone or something else. 
In both of these South African cases, the judges rejected the 
“conduit pipe” defense.  The judges found acting as a conduit pipe for 
an imputation of witchcraft to be a culpable act.  In S. v. Nomgca, the 
defendant had imputed witchcraft to a local woman claiming that a 
spirit (mfufanyana) had appeared to him and told him that the local 
woman was a witch who was trying to kill his wife.182  The judge 
argued that the principle in such a “conduit pipe” case involving 
imputations of witchcraft 
is no different from that in cases of defamation.  It is not an answer 
for an editor of a newspaper to say “I merely published what X has 
said and, if X says that the complaint or the plaintiff is a thief and I 
publish that, I am not responsible because I am merely repeating 
what somebody else said.”183 
 
 177. 1984 ZLR 175 (SC). 
 178. Id. at 76 (quoting §3 Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 73)) (this statute was 
amended in 2001.  See supra note 25, for the amended text of Section 3). 
 179. Ndhlovu, 1984 ZLR at 179. 
 180. 1980 (2) SA 707 (TkSC). 
 181. 1988 (3) SA 71 (VSC). 
 182. Nomgca, 1980 (2) SA at 708. 
 183. Id. at 709. 
FINAL DIWAN.DOC 3/8/2005  9:44 AM 
384 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:351 
Thus, claiming to act as a conduit pipe does not relieve someone of 
criminal liability for making an imputation of witchcraft.  In reference 
to a group of men accused of attacking an elderly woman after a child 
claimed that he had been bewitched by the woman, the judge in S. v. 
Mmbengwa & Others reasoned that 
[b]y accepting [the child’s] express or implied indication of the 
[elderly woman] as the person who had caused his illness through 
the use of supernatural powers, and by acting on it in assaulting 
[the elderly woman], [the group of men] imputed the cause of the 
illness to her, quite apart from a verbal indication or pointing out.184 
In both of these conduit pipe cases, the judges refused to 
consider the defendants’ genuine belief in witchcraft as a mitigating 
factor.  Instead, both judges focused on the potential harm an 
imputation of witchcraft could cause an “imputee.”  In S. v. Nomgca, 
the judge wrote, “it seems to me irrelevant to the present appeal 
whether [the defendant] believed in mfufanyanas or not.”185  The 
judge was not concerned with the defendant’s belief in witchcraft, and 
he focused on the principle that by transmitting the spirit’s message to 
the woman, the defendant made an imputation of witchcraft.   
C. Summary 
Both Zimbabwe’s Witchcraft Suppression Act and Section 1(a) 
of South Africa’s Witchcraft Suppression Act punish the imputation 
of the use of unnatural means to cause disease or injury.186  The law in 
both Zimbabwe and South Africa generally encourage judges to 
follow a reasonable person standard that does not consider the 
imputation of witchcraft to be reasonable behavior, however, by 
recognizing the potential harm an imputation of witchcraft can cause, 
the Witchcraft Suppression Acts do not regard these imputations as 
mere silliness or nonsense.  For example, in Zimbabwe, 
[i]t is clear from the [Witchcraft Suppression] Act read as a whole 
that the object is to suppress witchcraft in all its various 
manifestations . . . The purpose behind the Act, therefore, appears 
to be to suppress all those practices of witchcraft which are likely to 
cause some injury to the unfortunate victim.  It is true that the 
object of the Act is to suppress witchcraft but the object of the 
suppression is none-the-less [sic] to prevent injury to individuals.187 
 
 184. 1988 (3) SA at 73. 
 185. Nomgca, 1980 (2) SA at 708 (emphasis added). 
 186. §3 Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (Zimbabwe); §1(a) Witchcraft 
Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (South Africa). 
 187. R. v. Hunda, 1956 (3) SA 696, 697 (S.R.). 
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Judges’ reasoning in South African conduit pipe cases does not 
take into account the imputor’s belief in the conveyed imputation of 
witchcraft.  Rather, the act of being a conduit pipe itself, regardless of 
whether one believes in the message being conveyed, is seen as an 
illegal imputation of witchcraft.  In Nomgca, the judge’s likening of a 
conduit pipe to a newspaper editor who publishes a defamatory 
statement demonstrates how in conduit pipe cases, judges appear to 
focus less on genuine belief in witchcraft and more on the 
criminalization of imputation, regardless of a defendant’s intention.  
The author was only able to locate two such conduit pipe cases, both 
from South Africa.  The likely existence of other conduit pipe cases 
that are unreported or published in less widely circulated law reports 
makes the trend found in the two cases discussed above tentative.  
Conduit pipe cases may also be unreported in other African 
countries. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This study of judicial reasoning demonstrates that while African 
judges generally tend to give deference to state legal norms over 
norms underlying popular beliefs when the two conflict, judges do not 
give absolute superiority to such state legal norms.  In some narrow 
circumstances, witchcraft is considered a mitigating factor in judges’ 
decisions.  It appears that African judges in witchcraft controversies 
seek to establish the new normative orientations towards 
modernization and western norms that have emerged in the 
postcolonial period. 
In general, during the postcolonial period, judges have avoided 
admitting spectral evidence, and given significant consideration to 
norms underlying popular beliefs when deciding cases involving 
imputations of witchcraft and provocation.  Perhaps this greater 
consideration of popular norms in cases involving the defense of 
provocation has been due to judicial reasoning following the 
development of the common law doctrine of provocation.  This 
doctrine has seen an increase in the subjectivity of the reasonable 
person standard, and the inclusion of acts that are not overtly physical 
as reasonable provocation.  Also, there could be a conscious effort by 
judges to reconcile the conflict between norms underlying popular 
beliefs and state legal norms, which is why judges have at times been 
willing to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter if the 
defendant was reasonably provoked by an alleged act of witchcraft.  
Similarly, the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe view the 
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imputations of witchcraft as having the potential to cause serious 
harm, and as a result, the imputation of the use of non-natural means 
to cause disease or injury has been criminalized.  Here, state interests 
tie directly into norms underlying popular beliefs, as the potential 
threat that witchcraft imputations pose to social order is the likely 
motivation for the law.   
Southeastern Cameroonian judicial attitudes towards norms 
underlying popular beliefs in witchcraft serve as an exception.  These 
judges have been particularly responsive to popular beliefs and local 
norms, and they have generally subordinated state legal norms to 
popular ones by basing their decisions on spectral evidence provided 
by witch doctors.  In responding to popular needs to curb the practice 
of witchcraft, southeastern Cameroonian judges have gone too far, as 
accused witches whose guilt is based on dubious spectral evidence 
often receive harsh sentences.  By subordinating state legal norms to 
norms underlying popular beliefs, judges in southeastern Cameroon 
have shown a reluctance to accept the new normative orientation that 
has emerged in postcolonial African law. 
The cases discussed in this article demonstrate the challenge a 
new normative order can pose to preexisting popular norms—a 
challenge that takes the shape of a conflict of norms that is played out 
in the legal system where the two normative orientations clash head 
on.  To effectively reconcile old and new normative orientations, 
particularly norms underlying popular beliefs with state legal norms, 
the law should be responsive to serious needs and desires of a 
community, comprehensible by the people who are affected by it and 
comprehensive in providing solutions to legal problems that arise.188  
The cases involving witchcraft discussed in this article have shown 
that, with the exception of southeastern Cameroon, courts have not 
been consistently responsive to popular opinion demanding that the 
practice of witchcraft be curbed. 
This note is intended to serve as an exploratory survey to provide 
insight into the conflict between state legal norms and those norms 
underlying popular beliefs.  If solutions are not devised for the 
effective reconciliation of the conflict between norms underlying 
popular beliefs and state legal norms, the function of the law as an 
effective mechanism of social control in regions where local witchcraft 
norms remain salient will continue to pose a challenge.  Granting 
customary courts jurisdiction over certain types of witchcraft-related 
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disputes in limited circumstances may provide one potential solution.  
Alternatively, codification of customary law is another, less likely 
option.   Judges can also employ non-binding but authoritative texts 
on customary law or texts that restate established state law that 
provide insight into the manner judges have addressed witchcraft-
related legal issues in previous disputes as guidelines to follow when 
norms underlying popular beliefs clash with state legal norms.  The 
integration of norms underlying cultural beliefs are integrated to 
varying degrees by judges in African courts addressing witchcraft-
related disputes.  In order to prevent state legal norms from being 
perceived by many traditional Africans as illegitimate and foreign, 
thus undermining the continued development of legal systems 
throughout the region, state policies encompassing a more uniform 
integration of underlying cultural norms is advocated.   
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